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THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE COMMERCIAL OR
FINANCIAL EXEMPTION
Richard L. Kuersteiner* and Etta G. Herbach**
The Federal Freedom of Information Act went into effect
July 4, 1967, and was amended on November 21, 1974.' Its far-
reaching purpose was to revise and thereby reform section 3 of
the Administrative Procedure Act. That section originally di-
rected every executive agency to provide access to or publish
its methods of operation, public rules, procedures, precedents
and policies, as well as to make available official records to any
individual directly and properly concerned with them. As such,
section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act did not function
as a general public records law because it did not provide the
public at large with access to official records.2 In fact, although
the section was entitled "Public Information," it had been used
primarily to withhold rather than to disclose information which
the public desired.'
In enacting the Freedom of Information Act, Congress in-
tended that disclosure be the general rule, and courts in almost
every circuit have accepted this interpretation of the legisla-
tion.' Consistent with this general policy of disclosure, many
decisions support the position that the nine exemptions in-
cluded in the Act and designed to enable an agency to with-
* Counsel, Western Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command; B.A.,
1961, Washington and Lee University; J.D., 1964, University of Florida; Member,
Florida Bar.
** Law Clerk, Western Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command; B.A.,
1971, City University of New York at Brooklyn College; J.D., 1976, University of Santa
Clara.
The views expressed herein represent those of the authors and do not purport to
represent those of the Office of the General Counsel, the Department of the Navy, or
any other Agency or Department of the United States.
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970), as amended, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(1) (1974). See notes 85-
89 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of some of the effects of the 1974
amendments on exemption 4.
2. See H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
H.R. REP. No. 14971.
3. See H.R. REP. No. 1497 at 4.
4. Theriault v. United States, 503 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1974); Stretch v. Weinber-
ger, 495 F.2d 639 (3d Cir. 1974); Secretary of Labor v. Farino, 490 F.2d 885 (7th Cir.
1973); Stokes v. Brennan, 476 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1973); Tennessean Newspapers, Inc.
v. FHA, 464 F.2d 657 (6th Cir. 1972); Nichols v. United States, 460 F.2d 671 (10th Cir.
1972); Wells v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1971); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. General
Servs. Admin., 384 F. Supp. 996 (D.D.C. 1974); Brockway v. Department of the Air
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hold information under certain circumstances should be con-
strued narrowly.5
However, the Freedom of Information Act was not in-
tended to apply to all branches of the government. In
Verrazzano Trading Corporation v. United States,' the court
stated that "the Freedom of Information Act was enacted to
provide the public with the right to obtain information from
administrative agencies and agencies in the executive branch
of the government . . . ." Thus, neither the Congress nor thejudiciary falls within the purview of this legislation.
I. EXEMPTION 4
Subdivision (b) of the Act sets out nine "exemptions"
which enables the government to prevent disclosure under the
Act.' Exemption 4 provides:
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are-
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information
obtained from a person and privileged or confidential
This exemption is frequently invoked by the government and
vigorously contested by litigants. ' " While the statutory lan-
guage is ambiguous, the legislative history and the cases sketch
the scope of the exemption.
Legislative History
In 1964, the Senate Judiciary Committee issued a report
to accompany Senate Bill 1666, the 1964 version of the Public
Information section of the Administrative Procedure Act. Be-
cause the House of Representatives failed to act upon that
version, the proposed legislation did not reach fruition until the
Force, 370 F. Supp. 738 (N.D. Iowa 1974); Washington Research Project, Inc. v. HEW,
366 F. Supp. 929 (D.D.C. 1973); Charles River Park "A" Inc. v. HUD, 360 F. Supp.
212 (D.D.C. 1973); Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Veterans Admin.,
301 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Verrazzano Trading Corp. v. United States, 349 F.
Supp. 1401 (Cust. Ct. 1972).
5. Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC,
424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Sears, Roelbuck & Co. v. General Servs. Admin., 384 F.
Supp. 996 (D.D.C. Cir. 1974); Kreindler v. Department of the Navy, 372 F. Supp. 333(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Washington Research Project, Inc. v. HEW, 366 F. Supp. 929 (D.D.C.
1973).
6. 349 F. Supp. 1401 (Cust. Ct. 1972).
7. Id. at 1403 (emphasis added).
8. See Note, The Freedom of Information Act-The Parameters of the
Exemptions, 62 GEo. L. J. 177 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note, Parameters].
9. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1970).
10. See Note, Parameters, supra note 8, at 186.
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89th Congress. One should be aware, however, that the lan-
guage of exemption 4 in the 1964 Senate Bill is not the same
as the enacted version. While the 1964 version had designated
for exemption "trade secrets and other information obtained
from the public and customarily privileged or confidential,"
the enacted version included the words "commercial or finan-
cial" to modify "information," substituted the word "person"
for the word "public," and deleted the word "customarily."
Despite these changes, it appears that the Senate Report on the
enacted section" is substantially the same as the report on the
earlier, unmodified draft, 2 and contains no discussion of the
language variations. Furthermore, the House Report does not
explain the significance of the changes either.'3 As will be seen,
the failure of Congress to explain these changes and their in-
11. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965):
This exception is necessary to protect the confidentiality of informa-
tion which is obtained by the Government through questionnaires or
other inquiries, but'which would customarily not be released to the public
by the person from whom it was obtained. This would include business
sales statistics, inventories, customer lists, and manufacturing processes.
It would also include information customarily subject to the doctor-
patient, lawyer-client, lender-borrower, and other such privileges. Specif-
ically it would include any commercial, technical and financial data,
submitted by an applicant or a borrower to a lending agency in connec-
tion with any loan application or loan.
12. S. REP. No. 1219, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1964):
This exception is necessary to protect the confidentiality of informa-
tion which is obtained by the Government through questionnaires or
other inquiries, but which would customarily not be released to the public
by the person from whom it was obtained. This would include business
sales statistics, inventories, customer lists, and manufacturing processes.
It would also include information customarily subject to the doctor-
patient, lawyer-client, and other such privileges.
13. H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 2, at 10 (emphasis added):
Trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from
any person and privileged or confidential: This exemption would assure
the confidentiality of information obtained by the Government through
questionnaires or through material submitted and disclosures made in
procedures such as the mediation of labor-management controversies. It
exempts such material if it would not customarily be made public by the
person from whom it was obtained by the Government. The exemption
would include business sales statistics, inventories, customer lists, scien-
tific or manufacturing processes or developments, and negotiation posi-
tions or requirements in the case of labor-management mediations. It
would include information customarily subject to the doctor-patient,
lawyer-client, or lender-borrower privileges such as technical or financial
data submitted by an applicant to a Government lending or loan guaran-
tee agency. It would also include information which is given to an agency
in confidence, since a citizen must be able to confide in his Government.
Moreover, where the Government has obligated itself in good faith not to
disclose documents or information which it receives, it should be able to
honor such obligations.
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tended impact has presented the judiciary with some difficult
questions, most of which have been resolved in favor of disclo-
sure.
Interpretation of Legislative Intent
Although both the House and Senate Reports are conspic-
uously silent about the reasons for the language modifications,
there are some significant differences between the two reports.
At the outset of his 1967 article on the Freedom of Information
Act, Professor Kenneth Culp Davis states, "The main thrust
of the House committee remarks that seem to pull away from
the literal statutory words is almost always in the direction of
nondisclosure.'" Although both legislative bodies indicate that
the disclosable or nondisclosable character of the information
depends on whether the person from whom the information was
obtained would customarily have released it himself," the
House Report enlarges the applicability of this exemption: it
provides for nondisclosure based upon the importance of one's
being "able to confide in his Government," or upon the govern-
ment's obligation to honor a commitment not to disclose.'"
Recently, a federal district court found material exempt,
relying in part on this language in the House Report.'7 On the
other hand, in Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v.
Veterans Administration,'" the court chose to be guided by the
express language of the statute rather than the expansive inter-
pretation contained in the accompanying reports: "Although
the congressional reports on S. 1160 say that information not
commercial or financial in nature is exempted, this court is
required to follow the words of Congress.""' When courts look
to legislative reports in order to construe the statute in ques-
14. Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 761,
763 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Davis].
15. It should be noted that both the House and Senate Reports use the word
"customarily," even though this word was deleted from the exemption as finally en-
acted; many of the earlier court decisions also rely on the word "customarily." Appar-
ently, neither the legislative committees nor the judiciary attached much significance
to the deletion of this word. The rationale seems to be that the test of confidentiality
is identical to a determination of whether the person supplying the information would
customarily release it. See text accompanying notes 60-72 infra.
16. See note 13 supra.
17. Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. AEC,
380 F. Supp. 630, 636 (N.D. Ind. 1974).
18. 301 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
19. Id. at 802.
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tion, and those reports are based upon a draft which was not
adopted, the results of the various cases will depend upon how
much weight the reports are given. In any event, the courts
continue to seek guidance from the legislative reports.
The Purpose of Exemption 4
A leading case, National Parks and Conservation Associa-
tion v. Morton,2" declared that it is the obligation of the court
to "be satisfied that non-disclosure is justified by the legisla-
tive purpose which underlies the exemption."'" The court
continued: "In general, the various exemptions included in the
statute serve two interests-that of the Government in efficient
operation and that of persons supplying certain kinds of infor-
mation in maintaining its secrecy."22 The court indicated spe-
cifically that exemption 4 is designed to further both these
interests. The dual-interest interpretation has been adopted in
other cases, including Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC,3 where Chief
Judge Bazelon indicated that exemption 4 was intended to
serve "the important function of protecting the privacy and the
competitive position of the citizen who offers information to
assist government policy makers."'"
Another description of the purpose of this exemption is
found in Soucie v. David,5 which involved a suit by two citi-
zens who sought to compel the Director of the Office of Science
and Technology to furnish them with an evaluation of the
United States Government's program for the development of a
supersonic transport aircraft. The opinion noted, "This exemp-
tion is intended to encourage individuals to provide certain
kinds of confidential information to the Government and it
must be read narrowly in accordance with the purpose."" It is
20. 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
21. Id. at 767.
22. Id.
23. 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
24. Id. at 938; see Rural Housing Alliance v. United States Dep't of Agriculture,
498 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Chief Judge Bazelon's contributions to the judicial interpretation of the Freedom
of Information Act are discussed in Kramer & Weinberg, The Freedom of Information
Act, 63 GEO. L.J. 49 (1974). Many of the Freedom of Information suits are brought in
the District of Columbia courts because venue always lies there, under 5 U.S.C.A. §
552(a)(4)(B), and because many of the agencies' records are located there. See text
accompanying note 85 infra.
25. 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
26. Id. at 1078.
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significant that the Soucie court accompanied its interpreta-
tion of the general purpose of the exemption with a reiteration
of the rule of narrow construction, thus emphasizing, by impli-
cation, the two interests at stake.
But despite general agreement that the disclosure exemp-
tions are to be narrowly interpreted, there are a number of
cases in which the courts have found the exemption applicable,
thereby rendering the material in question nondisclosable.
Materials found not subject to disclosure include: (1) a United
States Department of Agriculture report containing informa-
tion on governmental housing discrimination in Florida;27 (2)
a cost report filed by a nursing home with the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare;" (3) custom forms completed
by individuals who entered the United States by air from Asia
and Australia;" (4) an aircraft accident report;3 (5) portions of
an application submitted to the Atomic Energy Commission
for a permit to construct a nuclear plant;3 1 (6) contractors'
reports for renegotiation and statements of non-applicability
regarding corporations holding national defense contracts;32
and (7) documents possessed by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion containing sales and profit data on corporations involved
in an antitrust suit.33 As this list suggests, the factors which
confer exemption from the general disclosure obligation are not
entirely clear.
II. SCOPE OF EXEMPTION 4
The exact scope of the exemption is clouded by the syntax
of section (b)(4). Courts have been forced to determine whether
"privileged or confidential" status alone is sufficient to exempt
material from disclosure, or whether the exemption applies
only to commercial or financial information that is also privi-
leged or confidential. Former Attorney General Ramsey Clark
acknowledged in a memorandum that the scope of exemption
4 is "particularly difficult to determine. The terms used are
27. Rural Housing Alliance v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
28. McCoy v. Weinberg, 386 F. Supp. 504 (W.D. Ky. 1974).
29. Ditlow v. Shultz, 379 F. Supp. 326 (D.D.C. 1974).
30. Brockway v. Department of the Air Force, 370 F. Supp. 738 (N.D. Iowa 1974).
31. Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. AEC,
380 F. Supp. 630 (N.D. Ind. 1974).
32. Fisher v. Renegotiation Bd., 355 F. Supp. 1171 (D.D.C. 1973).
33. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
[Vol. 16
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general and undefined. Moreover, the sentence structure
makes it susceptible of several readings, none of which is en-
tirely satisfactory."34 His opinion is shared by Professor Davis,
who has noted that "[tlhe Act is difficult to interpret and in
some respects . . .is badly drafted." 5
An early case, Barceloneta Shoe Corp. v. Compton,3" took
the position that three classes of documents were nondisclosa-
ble under the exemption: (1) trade secrets, (2) commercial or
financial information, and (3) information which is either priv-
ileged or confidential. It appears, however, that no other court
has adopted this interpretation; the majority have found only
two classes of documents covered by the exemption. One class
involves trade secrets; the other covers information which is (a)
either commercial or financial, and (b) obtained from a person,
and (c) privileged or confidential.37 Professor Davis concluded
that with respect to non-commercial and non-financial infor-
mation which is privileged or confidential,
[t]he requirements of common sense directly collide with
the clear statutory language. Obviously, the good faith
understanding that the information will be kept confiden-
tial should be honored [whether or not the material is
"commercial or financial"]. But the statutory words
clearly limit the exemption to "commercial or financial
information." The word "information" is modified by
"commercial or financial" and it is also modified by "priv-
ileged or confidential." The words plainly limit the ex-
emption to information which is commercial or financial
and which is privileged or confidential. Indeed, I think the
meaning of the statutory words is not merely reasonably
clear but entirely clear."'
The only Attorney General's Memorandum which exam-
ines exemption 4 in depth argues that information need not be
commercial or financial in nature to qualify for protection
under the exemption. After examining the legislative history of
exemption 4, the Attorney General concluded:
34. R. CLARK, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM ON THE PUBLIC INFORMATION
SECTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 32 (U.S. Government Printing Office,
1967) [hereinafter cited as R. CLARK].
35. Davis, supra note 14, at 761.
36. 271 F. Supp. 591 (D.P.R. 1967).
37. See, e.g., Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Rabbittv. Depart-
ment of the Air Force, 383 F. Supp. 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Consumers Union of the
United States, Inc. v. Veterans Admin., 301 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
38. Davis, supra note 14, at 787.
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It seems obvious from these committee reports that
Congress neither intended to exempt all commercial and
financial information on the one hand, nor to require dis-
closure of all other privileged or confidential information
on the other. Agencies should seek to follow the congres-
sional intention as expressed in the committee reports. 9
In spite of this memorandum, the courts have used a three-
pronged test to determine when material not classifiable as a
"trade secret" is covered by the fourth exemption. The ele-
ments of the test are that the information (1) must be commer-
cial or financial, (2) must be obtained from a person, and (3)
must be confidential or privileged.
Is the Information Commercial or Financial?
There have not been many cases interpreting the meaning
of "commercial or financial information." One of the few in
which the question was considered was Brockway v. Depart-
ment of the Air Force.40 In that case, the Department of the Air
Force possessed certain information regarding the death of the
plaintiff's son in an airplane crash. The plaintiff sought the
disclosure of a Cessna aircraft accident investigation report,
arguing that exemption 4 was inapplicable because the Cessna
report did not deal with commercial or financial information.
The Air Force claimed that the Cessna report "was provided
by a private commercial contractor under a guarantee of confi-
dentiality, thus being exempt under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4)." 4'
The court held that
[a]lthough the legislative history of the phrase "commer-
cial . . . information" contained in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) is
of little assistance. . . .Cessna Aircraft Company, being
a private defense contractor, is unquestionably a commer-
cial enterprise and the reports it generates must generally
be considered commercial information which in many in-
stances it may be unwilling to share with competitors.42
Thus, according to this opinion, a report by a "commercial
enterprise" must generally be considered to contain "commer-
cial information."
39. R. CLARK, supra note 34, at 34.
40. 370 F. Supp. 738 (N.D. Iowa 1974).
41. Id. at 740.
42. Id.
[Vol. 16
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Another case which examines the meaning of "commercial
or financial information" is Washington Research Project, Inc.
v. HEW.43 The case concerned the applicability of exemption
4 to research designs submitted in applications to the National
Institute of Mental Health for projects involving research on
the effects of various drugs on the behavior of children with
learning disabilities. The opinion stated:
The essence of the argument that the research designs
submitted in the expectation of confidentiality are trade
secrets or commercial information is that "ideas are a re-
searcher's 'stock-in-trade'." Their misappropriation,
which, it is claimed, would be facilitated by premature
disclosure, deprives him of the career advancement and
attendant material rewards in which the academic and
scientific market deals, in much the same way that misap-
propriation of trade information in the commercial world
deprives one of a competitive advantage. . . . [Tihe
reach of the exemption for "trade secrets or commercial or
financial information" is not necessarily coextensive with
the existence of competition in any form.
It is clear enough that a non-commercial scientist's
research design is not literally a trade secret or item of
commercial information for it defies common sense to pre-
tend that the scientist is engaged in trade or commerce
... . To the extent that his interest is founded on profes-
sional recognition and reward, it is surely more the interest
of an employee than of an enterprise, and we are far from
persuaded that Congress intended in Exemption 4 to apply
terms drawn from the business context to the employment
market."
Under this analysis, information is not "commercial or finan-
cial" unless the documents were prepared as part of a commer-
cial enterprise.
Taken together, these two cases hold that information will
be "commercial or financial" only if it came from a commercial
establishment, but any information from such a source satisfies
the test.
Was the Material Obtained from a Person?
The second element required for exemption 4 is that the
43. 504 F.2d 238 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
44. Id. at 244-45.
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material have been "obtained from a person." The primary
question is whether information may be obtained from a gov-
ernment employee and still be exempt.
Several cases have adopted the position that information
must be obtained from outside the government in order to fall
within the scope of the fourth exemption."5 For example, in
Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Veterans
Administration, the Court stated:
The words "obtained from a person" were changed
from "obtained from the public" by the Senate Judiciary
Committee. The suggestion that this change was intended
to exempt information obtained from another person
within the government was first made in the Attorney Gen-
eral's memorandum. This interpretation entirely disre-
gards the reason given by the Committee for the change."
Quoting from the 1965 Senate Report, the court noted that the
language was changed to convey the idea that the information
sought may be of a "highly personal" nature. The court then
concluded:
The committee clearly had no intention of including
information obtained from other government sources in
the exemption. To include it would pervert the purpose of
the Act for then commercial and financial information
could be made secret simply by transferring records from
one agency to another with the promise of confidentiality.
We accordingly follow the only reported decision on this
point and hold that the information must be obtained from
outside the government to be exempt. 7
The Circuit Court for the District of Columbia adopted the
same position in Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp. v. Re-
negotiation Board," stating:
This provision has been interpreted to encompass only in-
formation received from persons outside the Government.
45. See, e.g., Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1079 n.47 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Grum-
man Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578, 582 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
General Servs. Admin. v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878, 881 (9th Cir. 1969); Brockway v.
Department of the Air Force, 370 F. Supp. 738, 740 (N.D. Iowa 1974); Fisher v. Renego-
tiation Bd., 355 F. Supp. 1171, 1174 (D.D.C. 1973); Consumer's Union of the United
States, Inc. v. Veterans Admin., 301 F. Supp. 796, 802-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
46. 301 F. Supp. 796, 802-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
47. Id. at 803. The case referred to by the court is Benson v. General Servs.
Admin., 289 F. Supp. 590, 594 (W.D. Wash. 1968), aff'd, 415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1969).
48. 425 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
[Vol. 16
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We concur in this reading of the statute. The plain lan-
guage of the exemption-it applies only to "information
obtained from any person"-is reinforced by the statutory
history, which indicates that the exemption was not meant
to allow agencies to render documents "confidential" by
passing them back and forth among themselves.49
There is, however, some authority for the proposition that
information may be obtained from a government employee and
still be exempt. It is not surprising that the Attorney General's
Memorandum presents the following analysis:
It seems clear that applicability of this exemption should
not depend upon whether the agency obtains the informa-
tion from the public at large, from a particular person, or
from within the agency. The Treasury Department, for
instance, must be able to withhold the secret formulas
developed by its personnel for inks and paper used in mak-
ing currency.
An important consideration should be noted as to for-
mulae, designs, drawings, research data, etc., which, al-
though set forth on pieces of paper, are significant not as
records but as items of valuable property. These may have
been developed by or for the Government at great expense.
There is no indication anywhere in the consideration of
this legislation that Congress intended, by subsection (c),
to give away such property to every citizen or alien who is
willing to pay the price of making a copy. Where similar
property in private hands would be held in confidence,
such property in hands of the United States should be
covered under exemption [b](4).'"
There is also case law support for this interpretation of the
exemption. Rabbitt v. Department of the Air Force5 involved
a request for access to an Aircraft Accident Investigation Re-
port. In analyzing whether information from a government
source was covered by exemption 4, the court stated:
It is true that some courts in construing Exemption 4
have distinguished between statements given by Govern-
ment personnel and those furnished by civilian witnesses.
49. Id. at 582. See also Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1079 n.47 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
Brockway v. Department of the Air Force, 370 F. Supp. 738, 740 (N.D. Iowa 1974);
Fisher v. Renegotiation Bd., 355 F. Supp. 1171, 1174 (D.D.C. 1973).
50. R. CLARK, supra note 34, at 34; see Note, The Freedom of Information Act:
A Seven-Year Assessment, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 895 (1974).
51. 383 F. Supp. 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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In holding information obtained from witnesses outside the
government exempt from disclosure, these courts have
stressed that in a governmental investigation a civilian
may have a greater or more justifiable expectation of pri-
vacy than a government employee, and that there is a risk
that, absent such confidentiality, further cooperation with
government investigations would cease. We agree, how-
ever, with Judge Weinfeld's ruling in Kreindler v. Depart-
ment of the Navy that the statutory language of Exemp-
tion 4 supports no such distinction. The Freedom of Infor-
mation Act "conveys no discretionary power to vary the
standards established in the law itself." 2
The meaning of the words "obtained from a person" has
not been finally resolved. Generally, the District of Columbia
and Ninth Circuits have construed the language to include only
material obtained from sources outside of government, while
recent district court decisions in the Second Circuit have
adopted the interpretation that a person is a person, whether
he works for the government or not.53
Is the Information Confidential or Privileged?
The third and final element of the fourth exemption is that
the information be either "privileged or confidential." Most of
the cases involve material which is claimed to be confidential,
rather than privileged.
It seems clear that an unsupported claim of confidentiality
by the agency will not meet the requirements for classifying
information as "confidential." Cases have held that the follow-
ing types of information are not "automatically" confidential:
(1) a United States Department of Agriculture Report which
contained information on government housing discrimination
in Florida;54 (2) documents which describe contingency plans
for reduction of airline services if available fuel supply is re-
duced;" (3) various records of the National Highway Traffic
52. Id. at 1069 (citations omitted). See Kreindler v. Department of the Navy, 372
F. Supp. 333, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
53. However, Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Veterans Admin.,
301 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (see note 46 and accompanying text supra), also from
a district court in the Second Circuit, held that the word "person" excluded anyone
working for the government. This case was decided in 1969. The more recent cases
discussed in the text accompanying notes 51-52 supra reach a contrary result.
54. See Rural Housing Alliance v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 498 F.2d
73 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
55. See Cutler v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 375 F. Supp. 722 (D.D.C. 1974).
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Safety Administration examining safety defects in new auto-
mobiles;56 (4) a renegotiation agreement which contained sales
and profit statistics;57 (5) documents and transcripts compiled
by the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission during
the course of an investigation;5" and (6) documents relevant to
a rule-making proceeding by the Federal Trade Commission.59
What must be shown in order for material to be classified
as "confidential"? When the courts first began examining the
question of confidentiality, the test generally applied was
whether the individual supplying the information would want
it available for public perusal. If that question was answered
negatively, the material would be considered confidential.
Cases from both the District of Columbia"0 and the Ninth Cir-
cuits' have used this standard.
In National Parks and Conservation Association v.
Morton, 2 however, the District of Columbia Circuit developed
a new test for confidentiality. The Park Service had refused to
furnish plaintiffs with the results of audits and financial state-
ments filed by several companies operating concessions in the
national park. In determining whether the information was
confidential, the court stated: "Whether particular informa-
tion would customarily be disclosed to the public by the person
from whom it was obtained is not the only relevant inquiry in
determining whether that information is 'confidential' for pur-
poses of section 552(b)(4)."11
[C]ommercial or financial matter is "confidential"
for purposes of the exemption if disclosure of the informa-
tion is likely to have either of the following effects: (1) to
impair the Government's ability to obtain necessary infor-
mation in the future; or (2) to cause substantial harm to
the competitive position of the person from whom the in-
formation was obtained. 4
56. See Ditlow v. Volpe, 362 F. Supp. 1321 (D.D.C. 1973).
57. See Fisher v. Renegotiation Bd., 355 F. Supp. 1171 (D.D.C. 1973).
58. See M.A. Schapiro & Co. v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467 (D.D.C. 1972).
59. See Bristol-Myers, Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
60. See Fisher v. Renegotiation Bd., 473 F.2d 109 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Sterling Drug,
Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renego-
tiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Bristol-Meyers, Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935
(D.C. Cir. 1970); Washington Research Project, Inc. v. HEW, 366 F. Supp. 929 (D.D.C.
1973); M.A. Schapiro & Co. v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467 (D.D.C. 1972).
61. General Servs. Admin. v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1969).
62. 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974), noted in 88 HARV. L. REV. 470 (1974).
63. Id. at 767.
64. Id. at 770.
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Several other District of Columbia cases have adopted the test
set out in the National Parks case,65 as well as district courts
in the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Circuits."
There are, however, a few recent District of Columbia
opinions which do not employ the National Parks test. One
case, Ditlow v. Shultz,"7 cites National Parks, but the test it
employs contains broader language which might make it still
easier to establish confidentiality:
With respect to Exemption (4), it appears to this
Court that much of the information required by the Gov-
ernment and recorded on the Customs Declaration form is
confidential information that would not customarily be
disclosed to the public by the person from whom it was
obtained and also that public disclosure of the information
poses the likelihood of harm to legitimate private interests.
Disclosure of such information is excluded by Exemption
(4).6
The Ditlow test differs from that in National Parks to the ex-
tent that the Ditlow court considered the "likelihood of harm
to legitimate private interests," while the National Parks crite-
rion was "substantial harm to the competitive position."
Ditlow, however, does not provide for a showing of confidential-
ity by proof that disclosure will impair the government's ability
to acquire necessary information in the future. If the "effi-
ciency of government operation" argument is not available to
the government, it becomes correspondingly more difficult to
gain the benefit of the exemption; but the Ditlow court's si-
lence on the impairment point is certainly not conclusive, since
that aspect of confidentiality was not at issue in the case.
In Rural Housing Alliance v. United States Department of
Agriculture,"9 the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia
cited the twofold purpose of exemption (b)(4) as stated in the
National Parks decision.70 However, when the court actually
65. Pacific Architects & Eng'rs, Inc. v. Renegotiation Bd., 505 F.2d 383 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); Petkas v. Staats, 501 F.2d 887 (D.C. Cir. 1974); NeaI-Cooper Grain Co. v.
Kissinger, 385 F. Supp. 769 (D.D.C. 1974); Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. General Servs.
Admin., 384 F. Supp. 996 (D.D.C. 1974).
66. McCoy v. Weinberger, 386 F. Supp. 504 (W.D. Ky. 1974); Hughes Aircraft
Co. v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 292 (C.D. Cal. 1974); Porter County Chapter of the
Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. AEC, 380 F. Supp. 630 (N.D. Ind. 1974);
Brockway v. Department of the Air Force, 370 F. Supp. 738 (N.D. Iowa 1974).
67. 379 F. Supp. 326 (D.D.C. 1974).
68. Id. at 329 (emphasis added).
69. 498 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
70. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
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decided whether the information in question was confidential,
it relied exclusively on the "customarily released to the public"
test criticized in National Parks.7
Although there is still some conflict over what standard
should be used to determine confidentiality, the trend is to
adopt the National Parks test and to abandon the earlier "cus-
tomarily released" test.72
Trade Secrets
Any information which is classified as a trade secret is
protected from disclosure under the Freedom of Information
Act by exemption 4. A trade secret is generally defined as a
"plan or process, tool, mechanism, or compound known only to
its owner and those of his employees to whom it is necessary
to confide it.""
There appears to be only one case which has even consid-
ered trade secrets under the Freedom of Information Act. M.A.
Schapiro & Co., Inc. v. SEC" involved an attempt to force the
Securities and Exchange Commission to release documents
and transcripts compiled by its staff during the course of an
investigation. In considering whether the material could be
classified as a trade secret, the court stated:
It should be noted here that the information divulged
in the volumes of transcripts and documents does not re-
late to "trade secrets." Upon viewing them, one may
candidly state that their sole concern was the practice and
procedure for off-board trading. As among competitors and
the basic public that is involved in off-board trading, noth-
ing in the documents or transcripts could be classified as
a "trade secret." Moreover, none of the information given
71. The following is the court's entire discussion of the confidentiality element
of exemption 4:
Of course a bare claim by an interested government agency of confiden-
tiality is not sufficient. However, the listing of information obtained
strongly suggests the accuracy of the USDA's conclusion that the infor-
mation is implicitly and unquestionably not the kind of information that
would customarily be released to the public by the person from whom it
was obtained.
Rural Housing Alliance v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73, 79 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (citations omitted).
72. See note 15 supra.
73. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1666 (4th rev. ed. 1968).
74. 339 F. Supp. 467 (D.D.C. 1972).
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could objectively be said to be of the type that one would
mind revealing it to the public.75
Because of the decision in the case, the Schapiro court did not
have to make an affirmative determination as to what does
constitute a trade secret within the meaning of the Freedom of
Information Act. In the absence of any indication to the con-
trary, it seems reasonable to assume that the courts will follow
the generally accepted definition of trade secrets when apply-
ing the exemption.
III. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF EXEMPTION 4
Having examined the elements of section (b)(4), we will
now examine procedural aspects affecting the applicability of
the nine exemptions. Most of these considerations apply
equally to all of the exemptions in the Act, but we will limit
our discussion to the fourth exemption.
Proof Necessary to Establish the Exemption
The Freedom of Information Act places the burden of
proving an exemption on the agency resisting disclosure."6 The
question of what actually must be demonstrated by the agency
has arisen. The House Report on the Freedom of Information
Act states that judicial review of an agency's claim of exemp-
tion is intended to deter wrongful refusal to disclose and not to
impose an additional burden on the courts.77 To minimize the
potential burden, two recent cases, Vaughn v. Rosen"5 and
Cuneo v. Schlesinger,"° have required that the government pro-
vide the court with particularized and specific justification for
a claim of exemption. 0
Although these two cases did not involve exemption 4,
their requirements have been applied to the fourth exemption
75. Id. at 471.
76. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1974).
77. H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 2, at 9.
78. 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
79. 484 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
80. [W]e believe that the [burden on the courts] will be substan-
tially ameliorated if the Government is required to provide particularized
and specific justification for exempting information from disclosure.
Id. at 1092. The Cuneo court suggested also that the district court might "appoint a
special master to examine [the documents at issue and] the Government's justifica-
tion . . . . [in order to I relieve much of the burden of evaluating voluminous docu-
ments that currently falls on the trial judge." Id.
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by other cases. In Pacific Architects & Engineers, Inc. v. Rene-
gotiation Board,"' the court declared:
The specific procedures mandated by Vaughn and
Cuneo contemplated a detailed indexing of the allegedly
exempt material. . . . But the Vaughn and Cuneo deci-
sions mandate more than mere indexing of allegedly ex-
empt documents. They contemplated a procedure whereby
the agency resisting disclosure must present a "detailed
justification" for application of the exemption to the spe-
cific documents in dispute.8"
Furthermore, the court said, the "detailed justification"
should include the following, if the agency is to meet its burden
of proof:
(a) the extent to which data of the sort in dispute is
customarily disclosed to the public, with specific factual or
evidentiary material to support the conclusion reached;
(b) the extent to which disclosure of this information will
impair the government's ability to obtain necessary infor-
mation.of this type in the future, with specific factual or
evidentiary material to support the conclusion reached; (c)
the extent to which disclosure of the information will cause
substantial harm to the competitive position of the person
from whom the information is obtained, with specific fac-
tual or evidentiary material to support the conclusion
reached; and (d) the extent to which any harms of the type
mentioned in (b) and (c) could be reduced or eliminated
by nondisclosure of the identity of the person submitting
the information in dispute."'
In Camera Review of the Documents
A second question involves the procedure a judge should
use to verify a governmental agency's claim that the informa-
tion sought falls within an exception to the Freedom of
Information Act. Many cases have determined that an in
camera proceeding is the appropriate method to use. 4 This
81. 505 F.2d 383 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
82. Id. at 385.
83. Id.
84. See Tax Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, 505 F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
Theriault v. United States, 503 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1974); National Cable Television
Ass'n v. FCC, 479 F.2d 183 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Fisher v. Renegotiation Bd., 473 F.2d 109
(D.C. Cir. 1972); Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578
(D.C. Cir. 1970); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 292 (C.D. Cal. 1974);
Cutler v. CAB, 375 F. Supp. 722 (D.D.C. 1974); Kreindler v. Dep't of the Navy, 363
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position has been ratified by action on the part of Congress.
The 1974 amendment to the Freedom of Information Act pro-
vides:
On complaint, the district court of the United States in the
district in which the complainant resides, or has his prin-
cipal place of business, or in which the agency records are
situated, or in the District of Columbia, has jurisdiction to
enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to
order the production of any agency records improperly
withheld from the complainant. In such a case the court
shall determine the matter de novo, and may examine the
contents of such agency records in camera to determine
whether such records or any part thereof shall be withheld
under any of the exemptions set forth in subsection (b) of
this section, and the burden is on the agency to sustain its
action. 5
An Exemption Which Applies to Part of a Document
Several cases have involved the problem of a document
which is covered in part by an exemption. The question is
whether the remainder of the document must be released. One
approach, supported by case law, is to make deletions of identi-
fying information and/or information clearly within the rele-
vant exemptions, while disclosing the remaining informa-
tion." Congress has adopted this approach. The 1974 amend-
ment to the act requires the release of a document after dele-
tion of exempt portions."
A Seventh Circuit case, Secretary of Labor v. Farino,
F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); M.A. Schapiro & Co. v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467 (D.D.C.
1972); Frankel v. United States, 336 F. Supp. 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Wecksler v.
Schultz, 324 F. Supp. 1084 (D.D.C. 1971). For a discussion of in camera examination
of documents see Levin, In Camera Inspections Under the Freedom of Information Act,
41 U. CH. L. REV. 557, 572 -75 (1974).
85. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1974), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970) (emphasis
added). For legislative history of this provision, see H.R. REP. No. 12471, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 6267, 6272-73 (1974).
86. See National Cable Television Ass'n v. FCC, 479 F.2d 183 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v.
Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Bristol-Myers, Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d
935 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 384 F. Supp. 755 (D.D.C. 1974); M.A.
Schapiro & Co. v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467 (D.D.C. 1972); cf. Irons v. Schuyler, 321 F.
Supp. 628 (D.D.C. 1970).
87. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b) (1974). This section provides, in relevant part: "Any
reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting
such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt under this subsection."
88. 490 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1973).
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demonstrates another approach to the problem. In Farino,
decided before the 1974 part-disclosure amendment, the court
noted that while the Department of Labor is not required under
the Freedom of Information Act to disclose material found to
fall within an exemption, the Department's disclosure policy,
as set forth in the Code of Federal Regulations, states that
certain records of the Department of Labor which fall within
exemption 4 may be made available. Disclosure is limited to
the situation where the officer having authority to release the
information has made a determination that disclosure will be
in the public interest and will not be disadvantageous to the
functions of the Department of Labor. 9
"Reverse" Freedom of Information Suits
Occasionally, an agency is willing to release the desired
information, but the individual who provided that information
initiates an action to prevent disclosure. The person who re-
quested the information is usually not a party to the suit. An
early case held that the Freedom of Information Act should not
be applied in such a suit.9 More recent cases from the District
of Columbia have stated that while the Freedom of Information
Act does not necessarily confer jurisdiction in these "reverse
Freedom of Information Act" suits, it most assuredly does have
application in such a suit.9 Cases from district courts in the
Sixth and Ninth Circuits have adopted the position espoused
in District of Columbia cases."
A Balancing Test?
There apparently are only two reported opinions which
even consider whether a court, in determining the applicability
of an exemption, should attempt to balance or weigh the rea-
sons for disclosure against the agency's interest in nondisclo-
sure. Dissenting in Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Federal Trade
Commission,93 Chief Judge Bazelon indicated that a balancing
test should not be applied to exemption 4. Bazelon noted that
89. 29 C.F.R. § 70.11 (1976).
90. Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 360 F. Supp. (D.D.C. 1973).
91. See Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Kissinger, 385 F. Supp. 769 (D.D.C. 1974);
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. General Servs. Admin., 384 F. Supp. 996 (D.D.C. 1974).
92. Cf. McCoy v. Weinberger, 386 F. Supp. 504 (W.D. Ky. 1974); Hughes Air-
craft Co. v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 292 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
93. 450 F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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while other language in the statute-specifically, the wording
of section (a)(2)-appeared to require courts "to balance the
interests affected by disclosure," section (b)(4) contains no
such directive. 4
In the second case, Rural Housing Alliance v. United
States Department of Agriculture,"5 the court examined the
applicability of exemption 4 and remanded the case "to the
District Court for reconsideration of exemption 4 for reasons
similar to those discussed regarding exemption 6."96 An exami-
nation of the court's analysis of exemption 6, which dealt pri-
marily with the balancing test to be used in determining its
applicability, indicates the appellate court's belief that a bal-
ancing test was also appropriate for exemption 4.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Freedom of Information Act, as the legislative history
indicates, was enacted with the realization that
[a] democratic society requires an informed, intelligent
electorate, and the intelligence of the electorate varies as
the quantity and quality of its information varies ...
The needs of the electorate have outpaced the laws which
guarantee public access to the facts in Government ...
S. 1160 will correct this situation. It provides the nec-
essary machinery to assure the availability of Government
information necessary to an informed electorate."
The complicated legislative history of exemption 4 pre-
sents problems in determining the intended scope of the ex-
emption. In general, courts have determined that there is a
twofold purpose behind this exemption: first, preventing dis-
closure of information where disclosure would place the person
or entity that supplied the information at a competitive disad-
vantage; and second, promoting governmental efficiency by
assuring continued access to sources of information. The ex-
emption is narrowly construed; nevertheless, as this article has
indicated, it has been applied in a wide variety of cases.
The exact scope of exemption 4 is uncertain and it will
probably remain so until there is a definitive opinion by the
Supreme Court setting out with some precision the parameters
94. Id. at 715 (dissenting opinion).
95. 498 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
96. Id. at 79.
97. H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 2, at 12.
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of the exemption. No case defines "trade secret" as used in the
exemption, but the usual definition would appear to be appro-
priate. If the information is not a trade secret, most courts
require a showing of three elements before the exemption will
apply. The first element is that the information be "commer-
cial or financial" in nature. The general rule is that it must be
from a commercial entity; any information of this type is com-
mercial within the meaning of the statute.
The second element is that the information must be "ob-
tained from a person." A majority of the cases have held that
this excludes information from a governmental source, but
there is some authority for the contrary position. Finally, the
information must be "privileged or confidential." This require-
ment is satisfied if disclosure would impair the ability of the
government to obtain needed information in the future, or if
release would substantially harm the competitive position of
the person who supplied the information.
The Freedom of Information Act has increased public ac-
cess to information in the government's possession, and there-
fore has made our society more open. But, as always, privilege
exacts its price. Many government officials argue that one of
the costs is an inordinate amount of paper work. A recent peri-
odical has cited figures from the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, which initially had a staff of eight to process Freedom of
Information Act requests, but now has 191 employees handling
these requests." There is obviously a significant economic price
being paid by the citizens of the United States in order to have
increased access to information held by the government.
Nevertheless, we believe that our democratic processes can
function most effectively with a well informed electorate. The
goal of increased disclosure of governmental information em-
bodied in the Freedom of Information Act represents an impor-
tant step toward making information available to the Ameri-
can public. Although this law has generated many troublesome
legal and administrative problems, we feel that the game is
worth the candle.
98. NEWSWEEK, Feb. 2, 1976, at 50.
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